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End of the
ERA
The Labor supremacy in Australian politics seems to be 
drawing to a close. A new age of uncertainty looms. ALR 
assembled a roundtable discussion to assess the economic 
legacy of the Labor era, and to look ahead.
T
ony Aspromourgos is a visiting fellow 
at the U niversity of NSW. Mike 
Johnson is director of the Public Sector 
Research Centre atUNSW. Cohn Kear­
ney is professor of economics at the University of 
Western Sydney. Sue McCreadie is the economic 
research officer for the Textile, Clothing and Foot­
wear unions. The discussion was chaired by 
Prudence Anderson, an economic journalist with 
the Financial Review.
economic base. So: has the Hawke government been a 
truly radical government in terms of trying to come to 
grips with the economic problems facing this country?
It seem s clear now that Labor's hegem ony over econom ic 
policy in  the 80s is com ing to an end. Probably m ost o f 
the Labor governments around the country w ill fall from
Tony: Partly as a result of the way the Fraser government 
got burnt in the wages explosion of 1981-82, the basic 
strategy of the Hawke government from the beginning was 
built around employment growth within the Accord 
framework. Keating's argument was that the most impor­
tant policy from a social equity standpoint was full employ­
ment. I've got a lot of sympathy with that. The policy of 
pushing the system to full employment should be an essen­
tial plank for Labor governments In power nationally.
I tower w ithin the next two years. TTub makes it tim ely too '  -  -  -look at the Hawke government's economic record over 
the last eight years. We first need to make some judg­
ments about how successful the Hawke government has 
been in addressing the fundamental structural problems 
that have confounded all the social agendas that govern­
ments have tried to pursue for decades. You can't go 
constructing grand social v isions on a very shaky
The problem is that within two years, after a bit of pump- 
priming and a bit of help from the end of the drought, they 
came up against the external constraint In 1985-86 the 
currency started free-falling and the central question which 
arose from that was: is the Australian economy structurally 
capable of generating full employment? Given the current 
rate of growth in the workforce, you're going to need 
probably a little over three and a half per cent real output 
growth per year to suck up that increase in the workfoi
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into jobs. Is that sustainable in our current situation? The 
answer that most people would offer is 'no'.
The strategy of structural adjustment was really an attempt 
to overcome those constraints. The buzz-word has been 
'microeconomic reform'. I'd prefer to call it 'competition 
policy', because the basic logic of it is that an increase in 
competition will bring structural adjustment. I agree that 
full employment and a rate of growth consistent with that 
should be central to a Labor policy. The question is whether 
Keating's version of competition policy can get us there, 
and if it can't, what can, if anything?
So you're saying that Keating really hasn't spent enough 
time thinking about routes to adjustment.
Tony; He has, but he's come up with a policy which I don't 
think works. There's a lot of moralistic, almost theological 
nonsense about this—people are saying this is the reces­
sion we had to have, as if it's a cleansing experience. Well, 
you've got to get all that moral nonsense out of your head. 
The fact is that recessions do not restructure economies.
Mike: I think you're generally right, but you've missed the 
role of investment. Australia in the 70s and 80s clearly had 
an in vestm en t problem . That w as critica l to the 
government's priorities for structural change. Arising from 
the Campbell Committee in the 70s was the view that if you 
deregulated interest rates, and deregulation directed in­
vestment in the economy, you would get a flowering of 
entrepreneurial companies with new technologies and 
new directions. Associated with that, Keating specifically 
addressed the tax system to cure that investment problem. 
He d id it in two ways. Firstly, hedidawaywith the double 
taxation of profits. Then he reduced the top tax rates— 
adopting what has been the conservative view throughout 
the world during the late 70s and 80s, that if you 
redistribute wealth to the rich, they will invest it in produc­
tive sectors.
The truth of the matter was that they didn'tdo thatbecause 
there weren't enough productive sectors to invest in. What 
they did was to go on a splurge in financial markets with 
a whole range of asset investments that have proved not to 
generate long-term real returns. The strategy to push struc­
tural change through redistributing wealth into new sec­
tors collapsed on the rocks of the 1987 crash. And frankly, 
in 1991, the situation has not recovered. We've seen the rest 
of the speculative investments evaporate through the col­
lapse of financial institutions in the late 1980s. That, as we 
look back from the 90s, was a critical failure.
Sue: We need to ask why there was this failure of invest­
ment. Was it simply a failure of Australia's corporate 
leaders to actually make the right investment decisions and 
turn their attention to the productive sector, or was it a 
failure of policy, or a combination of both? It seems the 
environment which the government created was one 
which biased investment towards non-productive invest­
ment. When they removed accelerated depreciation as a 
trade-off for reductions in corporate tax, that created a bias 
away from manufacturing and back towards the financial 
sector.
Mike: The other thing that's missing from the whole 
analysis is that Australia is integrated into the global 
economy. That is, we have become locked into a global 
financial system that has invested enormous financial as­
sets, which were earned right back into the 1950s, in a 
whole range of speculative ventures, because real invest­
ment in productive enterprises in the sense of being con­
cerned with tradeable goods and services has actually 
fallen away. So in the United States we have the Savings & 
Loans scandal, we have bank collapses in Britain, and in 
this sense Australia is just a follower, as it has always been 
a follower.
Colm: You asked: has the Hawke government been radi­
cal? And my answer to that is yes. Whereas previous Labor 
governments were concerned about the distribution of the 
national cake, as early as 1986, the World's Greatest 
Treasurer realised his policies had to be concerned about 
the generation of the national cake. That was traditionally 
the concern of the Liberal Party. So, that was radical for a 
Labor Party. But the policies that followed on from it were 
conservative ones.
As I see it , these problem s are that we have an 
entrepreneurial sector that is bo th inward-looking and has 
a short-term horizon. Look at Germany, for example, 
where the relationship between the banks and the in­
dustrial sector is such that both loans and investments are 
much longer-term than they are in Australia. In Japan 
you've also got a system where trade unions, business and 
government take long-term investment positions. They 
will actually operate at a loss over periods of between five 
years and a decade to wipe out the opposition in foreign 
countries so that they can create export markets. What has 
happened here is that the level playing-field', together 
with deregulation, means we're tied into a short-term 
horizon and we're going for short-term gains. So no matter 
what kind of indirect lever you pull, it's not going to work.
If you look at the top 50 exporters in Australia, more than 
half of them are owned by foreign companies. That is 
completely at odds with all other major exporters in the 
world because we're suffering from the historical result of 
a tariff system which was put in place to be purely inward- 
looking. The Right has used the abuse of the tariff structure 
in Australia to argue for a level playing-field, and that's 
completely wrong; we have to tilt the playing-field in 
favour of exports.
If the problem has been one of improving the trade 
performance, presumably we have to discover how best 
we can provide a structure to do that, a way of setting 
goals and priorities...
Colm: It's easy. We economists are taught that there are 
four goals of government: full employment; price stability; 
imports equal to exports; and economic development. The 
practical policy objectives put in place by governments 
usually also involve some level of inflation. But listen to 
Hewson: zero to 2% inflation. That's absolute poppycock. 
In an open economy you cannot have a target for inflation 
which is set apart from the level of world inflation. We have 
targets on inflation, we have targets on unemployment I
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have never heard of a target for exports. If you can target 
a composite aggregate like inflation, why can you not have 
a target for exports? What we need to do is to target export 
growth.
Sue: Colm pointed out that the government was radical 
because it was focusing on the size of the cake rather than 
simply the distribution. I suppose what was new about the 
union movement under the Hawke government and the 
Accord was that it too was focused on the size of the cake. 
But it had quite a different perspective. What it sought of 
the Accord was, first of all, participation in publ ic economic 
management - something which has not really occurred. 
There's been some element of participation through tripar­
tite bodies like the Australian Manufacturing Council. But 
generally the old bureaucracies continued to exercise a 
very strong influence, while the new tripartite bodies had 
limited power to influence government decisions,
Colm: It ’s p o p p yco ck  to 
argue w e ’ve purchased low  
inflation
The unions' agenda was modified in the light of both 
external circumstances and what was achievable in the 
context of government policy, but only aspects of it were 
ever implemented. There were the sectoral plans - the steel 
and engineering plans, the car plan and the Textiles, Cloth­
ing and Footwear plan — some more successful than 
Others. But although history might tell you that it would 
have worked, you never have had that package imple­
mented. There was a real failure to address that entrenched 
power in the bureaucracy—partly it's inertia and partly it's 
the dominance of that economic rationalist framework, 
which has had an overwhelming influence on decision­
making.
Tony I want to come back to this investment question. I 
agree that investment is the key to restructuring. The 
government seems to believe that profit share is crucial to 
getting that investment; in other words, that the overall 
balance between wages and profits was wrong, and had to 
be altered in the favour of profits. I don't know why this 
is the weirdest economic fashion I can remember in my 
short life. In fact, 1 know of no systematic theoretical argu­
ment, orthodox or otherwise, as to why profit-share should 
determine investment.
On the other hand, I don't think the behaviour of invest­
ment in the 80s is particularly mysterious from a standard 
Keynesian point of view. After the recession of 1982-83, you 
had two years of strong growth; it took two years to rebuild 
demand back to something like normal capacity. And at 
that point in 85-86, if demand growth had continued, you 
would have seen investment demand respond. It was at
just that time that the exchange rate collapsed, the 
monetary brakes were put on, and interest rates rose, and 
that's what stopped investment from taking off at just the 
point where it normally would have, from a Keynesian 
point of view.
If there has been any real success from the shakeout of the 
last couple of years it has been the decline of asset inflation. 
I don't think we should underestimate the importance of 
this. The old Australian entrepreneurial method of relying 
on asset inflation in excess of commodity inflation, and 
therefore concentrating on capital gains rather than trading 
and producing commodities, has suffered really serious 
blows in the last couple of years. As well there's the fact 
that the entrepreneurs who specialised in reaping the 
benefits from asset inflation are going broke and some of 
them are possibly even going to jail. I think that is a really 
im portant event for the psychology of Australian 
entrepreneurship, and I think it will prove very beneficial.
As I said earlier, I do not believe this recession will restruc­
ture the economy. However, we can't rewrite history now; 
this is where we are. It is very important to sustain our 
present low inflation rate, because that really is the only 
thing we have to show for the amount of working-class 
blood that's been spilled in this recession.
Colm; I am pessimistic about Australia's ability to sustain 
low inflation, because we have done nothing to restructure 
the economy into a low inflation path. ITs poppycock to 
argue that, as a result of the recession, we have managed 
to purchase a creed of low inflation. We haven't. As soon 
as demand picks up, commodity price inflation is going to 
take off again, depending on the vagaries of the exchange 
rate. Also, we have built into the system five years of wage 
restraint just waiting to bubble over and build again into 
price inflation.
W hat w ould be required to generate low inflation?
Colm: I don't believe we can generate permanent low 
inflation in this economy. Our inflation rate is tied to the 
rate measured as an average of the inflation rate of our 
major trading partners. And until we realise that, and build 
up our productivity and export performance, we're not 
going to do it.
So you see it as a totally inappropriate target?
Colm: It's completely off the planet. Our inflation rate is 
temporarily low; it*s going to catch up.
Tony: Colm raised the question of targeting exports. I have 
to say I am doubtful, if you look at the sort of trade surplus 
required for Australia to stabilize foreign liabilities, 
whether export growth is capable of carrying the burden 
of restructuring. I wonder whether we're not also going to
have to keep in mind import replacement.
Sue: That's probably one of the major failings of the Ha wke 
government's strategy, There's been an obsession with 
exports, and there's been a move away from the initial goal 
of a more diversified manufacturing sector towards a more
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specialised export-oriented one. The legacy of high tariffs 
has fostered the belief that tariffs alone are responsible for 
inward-looking and anachronistic practices and industrial 
lethargy. That in turn has tarnished the image of import 
replacement. That's a real problem because if you look at 
the approach of more successful economies you can see 
that in order to successfully replace imports you've got to 
have the latest in manufacturing technology; you've got to 
have high product differentiation; you've got to acquire all 
the things that the drive towards high value-added 
manufacturing and services require. But we've paid very 
little attention to this in the context of import replacement.
Colm: 1 agree that insufficient attention has been paid to 
import replacement. Rather the policy has been import 
curbing. That's of course the easier thing to do. If you want 
to replace imports, you've got to have an entire industrial 
policy, whereas if you want to curb imports, all you do is 
raise interest rates. And this government has gone for the 
easy solution. All I'm saying is, if you don't want to get 
caught in a cyde where you're dependent on external 
developments, then what you've got to do is raise exports.
Mike: That takes us back to the point Colm raised before. 
In other, more successful economies there's a longer time 
horizon and all the elements of the economic picture are 
interlinked. So, for example, German banks are interlocked 
with industrial concerns with an interest in exports. Yet in 
Australia this sort of interlocking of interests —■ which was 
in a sense the original intent of the Accord— has just never 
happened.
The most sustained attempt to achieve precisely those 
sorts o f interconnections in Australia was of course in 
Victoria. Yet that legacy is now under a cloud. What 
happened in Victoria? How was it that a few major high- 
profile financial cock-ups eclipsed the value of all that 
was achieved beforehand?
Tony: There were two arms to the Victorian strategy — one 
of which I think was disastrously ill-conceived, and the 
other which may have survived if it hadn't been for the 
failure of the former. If I understand it correctly, the Vic­
torian government believed it could run fiscal policy in the 
old-fashioned Keynesian way, independently of any back­
up from the federal government. That was a fatal mistake. 
In severely constrained economies like ours there are grave 
limits on one's room to manoeuvre even at a national level. 
Moreover national governments have two things that state 
governments don't have, which make it much easier to 
cope with these constraints — they can dictate interest 
rates, and they can print money Without that ability state 
governments can't set their own independent strategies at 
will. So Victoria should never have been in that game.
The other arm to the Victorian strategy was of course 
micro-economic intervention, which is clearly diametrical­
ly opposed to the Keating position on how to restructure 
die economy. And that I think had merit. It is a great pity 
that two or three disasters — albeit massive disasters, 
which will fiscally cripple Victoria for a long time— should 
be used to discredit the whole strategy. I don't know what
the hell the VEDC was trying to do, but whatever they were 
doing they were screwing up very badly.
Mike: The Victorianproblem was a managerial failure 
resulting from the inability of the political apparatus to 
ensure that enterprises were financially responsible and 
accountable. The government utilised the existing finan­
cial apparatus and leadership without imposing any 
strong controls to ensure that investment capital didn't go 
into the pockets of enterprises or organisations that in some 
cases may have been corrupt, but which more often were 
just incompetent Now all the bright features of the Vic­
torian economy, which were a few, have been lost in this 
overall failure.
Colm: The same happened to the first Mitterand govern­
ment in France in the early 80s. Ho tried to pump-prime 
demand, to "ride it out", while in the US and Britain they 
were running really tight fiscal policy stances, Mitterand 
was forced to bring his economic policy back into line with | 
his major trading partners. Likewise Victoria was running 
a looser fiscal policy, when the federal government was 
tightening the reins.
Sue: Victoria has the VEDC fiasco and Tricontinental dis­
aster among others. But overlaying them all is the problem 
of the recession now — that is arguably the most severe1 
problem in terms of employment and output, and it's 
caused federally by tight monetary policy.
Colm: We can point the finger if we wish at the level o! 
business enterprise activity in Victoria, but have the 
austerity policies of the Greiner government in NSW done 
much better? I doubt it.
Connected to these questions are the trends in publit 
sector administration and management over the 80s — 
which, as Mike points out, played a role in the Victorias 
debacle. Obviously there's been a revolution in Australia 
in the 80s around these sorts of questions. How does this 
revolution measure up now?
Tony: The key issue here is the shift towards comma* 
dalisation and corporatisation in public sector manage* 
ment. The Greiner Government in NSW has adopted these 
ideas with a great deal of ideological fervour— too much, 
in fact. But the federal government has also been adopting 
them much more quietly — possibly because it has to 
appeal to a different constituency.
Tony: The fa c t is, recessions 
do not restructure 
econom ies
I have to say — and I know this is unfashionable on the 
Left— that I personally am in favour of a great deal of this 
trend. I think the financial balance between the budget 
sector and the trading enterprise sectors in government 
expenditure was clearly wrong, and that there was a need 
to reduce the subsidy from the budget sectors to the traded 
sectors. A lot of the cross-subsidies, both within the traded 
sector, and between the budget and the traded sector, were 
really a product of a massive dose of pork-barrelling. They 
had no real social justice, or equity, or access rationale, and 
there was a need to redress that I think i f  s also true that 
the intervention of executive government in commercial 
government enterprises has an appalling history in 
Australia. The balance between accountability to the ex­
ecutive and ultimately to parliament on the one hand, and 
managerial freedom on the other, is a very complex ques­
tion —• much more difficult than either Carr or the Greiner 
government have understood. But nevertheless, I think the 
shift towards commercialisation is desirable and a good 
thing.
Mike: 1 a g r e e  that the government business enterprises 
were in need of shaking up, and the major enterprises 
within the sector — particularly electricity, water, and the 
banking system — needed to be put on a commercial basis. 
The truth of the matter is that in the past it wasn't on a 
commercial basis and there was a regime of jobs for the 
boys — and there were plenty of them, too. The health of 
the government business enterprises is vital to sill other 
sectors of the economy, and so i t's essential tha t they be run 
efficiently. The problem is that the debate has focused on 
reducing staffing levels, rather than restructuring them to 
become more effective and efficient. In the case of 
electricity authorities total efficiency means assessing not 
just supply-side efficiency but also demand-side and end- 
use efficiency. In the case of the transport system, the 
railways have to be adjusted to the needs and objectives of 
industry in Australia. Running rail lines to little towns may 
have a good sodal rationale, but even if it does it should 
be explidtly separated from the business objectives of the 
enterprise.
Did the labour movement ever really think that the con­
servative agenda for econom ic reform  w ould work?
Sue: Those in the union movement who had an interest in 
industry policy always said this agenda wouldn't work 
We don't really have a macroeconomic industry policy in 
the sense that none of the real problems about investment 
have been addressed. Tony earlier stressed the importance 
of aggregate investment. I think you have to break down 
that investment and look at the real failure to take up 
advanced manufacturing technology, and to look at things 
like flexible manufacturing systems in which Australia's 
performance is very poor. I agree, in a sense, with those in 
the union movement who said that the corporate sector has 
a lot to answer for in its failure to take up the opportunities 
available to it. In fact the blame lies jointly with govern­
ment and the corporate sector; the problem for the unions 
is that they don't run either.
I feel somewhat pessimistic about the future of industry. If 
I wanted to look for a ray of hope then I would have to say
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that one of the great visions of the Labor government has 
been to try to modernise the economy. There has been a 
commitment to a new workplace culture. The national 
training system, the focus on the skills base, the centres of 
excellence and the drive to try to link R & D establishments 
to industry and to TAFE colleges, are all part of that vision. 
It remains to be seen to what extent all that workplace 
reform is a permanent change in the way we operate or 
whether a drive towards labour market deregulation 
under a Coalition government would undo it all. The idea 
of the workplace resource centres was that they would 
survive a conservative government because they were 
bipartite, and perhaps industry would have had time to see 
it was worthwhile. The German national training system 
has survived a conservative government and it's some­
thing the country's very proud of. So perhaps when we 
look back at the Labor government in five or ten years we'll 
say that at least they laid the foundations in training and 
workplace reform.
This brings me to our final question. Here we are with 
our political cycle m oving us towards what seem s almost 
the inevitability  of overwhelm ing dom ination by conser­
vative govemments-in-waiting with pretty hardline 
agendas. Yet elsew here in  the world these agendas seem  
to have been considerably discredited. How plausible are 
they for Australia in the 90s?
Tony: There is a strong feeling in sections of the Liberal 
Party that the Fraser years were wasted years; they had a 
tremendous mandate and controlled both houses— some­
thing which won't happen again for many years — and 
basically they did nothing with it. The conservatives may 
have more backbone this time than last time, but the nature 
of our entrenched two-party system is such as to move 
parties towards the centre in government. So the crudal 
question is: how much of the rhetoric of conservatism in 
opposition will be translated into policy in government? I 
think you've got to be sceptical based on historical ex­
perience.
Colm: This era of Labor government is now going to end 
as it began, with Austral ia emerging from a deep recession. 
When the boom comes, it's going to be a gradual boom in 
the United States, Europe and so on, and our trading 
constraints will be relieved even if we do nothing, so the 
conservatives will come to power shortly after the reces­
sion bottoms out. There will still be a rising economy when 
they go to the next election, and they will be judged as 
having engineered the emergence from the recession in the 
early 90s.
What are the implications of all of this for the labour 
movement and the Labor Party? We're going to have a 
Labor Party in opposition with a diminished trade union 
movement There's going to have to be a fundamental 
rethinking of the role o f  the trade union movement in 
Australian politics and Australian economic policymak­
ing. That is rather a pity, because one of the great positive 
contributions of this Labor government has been the en­
hancement of the standing of trade unions in the economic 
process. What is going to emerge from that rethinking 
process, I don't know.
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